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TULANE
LAW REVIEW
Vol. XIX

DECEMBER, 1944

No. 2

THE PLACE OF WRONG: A STUDY IN THE
METHOD OF CASE LAW*
MAX RHEINSTEIN-

Our inquiry into the cases may start appropriately with
those which are stated by Beale as supporting the Restatement. For the proposition that "the place of wrong is the
place where the person or thing harmed is situated at the
time of the wrong," 4 ' on the law of which place the bulk of
the problems of the law of torts is said to depend,42 the following cases are adduced: Otey v. Midland Valley R. Co.,
Connecticut Valley Lumber Co. v. Maine Cent. R.R., Keeler v.
Fred T. Ley & Co., Moore v. Pywell, and Cameron v. Vandergriff.

43

. *This is the second and concluding installment of the present article,
the first having appeared in 19 Tulane L. Rev. 4 (October, 1944).
tMax Pam Professor of Comparative Law, University of Chicago Law
School.
412 Beale, op. cit. supra note 4, at p. 1287, § 377.2.
42
Id. at p. 1288 et seq., § 378.1 et seq., especially § 378.1: "It is impossible for a plaintiff to recover in tort unless he has been given by
some law a cause of action in tort; dnd this cause of action can be given
only by the law of the place where the tort was committed. That is the
place where the injurious event occurs, and its law is the law therefore
which applies to it." Restatement of Conflict of Laws (1934) § § 378
(whether a person has sustained a legal injury), 379 (liability-creating
conduct), 381 (specific conditions of liability), 383 (causation), 384
(cause of action in tort recognized in other states only when created at
the place of wrong), 385 (contributory negligence), 386 (fellow servant),
387 (vicarious liability, subject, however, to the proviso that the principal has authorized the agent to act in the state of the place of wrong),
388 (defenses on the merits), 389 (discharge or modification of liability to pay damages), 390 (survival of action), 391 et seq. (right of
action for death), 412 (measure of damages).
43See infra notes 44, 46, 70, 59, and 58, respectively.
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In Otey v. Midland Valley R. Co.,44 a farmer sued a railroad
company for the destruction of his barn by a fire which was
allegedly caused by a spark from one of the .defendant's locomotives. The barn was located in Oklahoma at a short distance from the Kansas line, and the railroad was running
across the line from Kansas into Oklahoma. The action was
brought in Kansas. The lower court held for the plaintiff
and error was assigned "because the trial court refused to
instruct the jury that before they could return a verdict for
plaintiff they must first find from the evidence that the fire
originated from defendant's engine while it was being operated in the state of Oklahoma." To this argument the 'court
replied as follows: "It is argued that if the fire was set by a
spark which escaped from the engine before the engine crossed
the state line, there could be no recovery. Such is not the
law. It is highly probable . . . that the spark escaped while
the engine was crossing the state line; but whether it was or
not, a recovery was proper whether the engine was in Kansas,
or on the state line, or in Oklahoma. The damage occurred in
Oklahoma. If it was caused by defendant's engine, that was
all that was necessary-unless it were shown that the Oklahoma law touching the right of recovery for damages or the
measure of damages was different from our own."
This concise statement is followed by nothing more than a
simple reference to the cases of C.meron v. Vandergriff and
Moore v. Pywell.45 Since these cases are usually regarded as
being among the main pillars of the place-of-harm rule, the
decision may well be regarded as, indeed, adopting that rule.
That interpretation is not absolutely conclusive, however. The
language of the court might also be understood as a simple
statement that both a factual inquiry into the place of acting
and a legal inquiry into the applicability of Oklahoma or Kansas law would be superfluous as long as no diversity of the
two laws was shown. Whatever interpretation of the court's
ambiguous language might be correct, the decision contains
44108 Kan. 755, 197 Pac. 203 (1921).
45

See infra notes 58 and 59, respectively.
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no articulate discussion of our problem, since, under the circumstanceS, the court had no need to choose between Oklahoma and Kansas law.
Connecticut Valley Lumber Co. v. Maine Cent. R.R. 46 is
47
stated by Beale as being in "accord" with the Otey case.
However, its holding, far from being in accord with, is opposite to what the Otey case is said to stand for. The only concivable justification for quoting the case as supporting the
place-of-harm rule lies in the fact that lip service is paid to
the place-of-harm rule, to which the decision of the case purports to establish an exception. The facts are similar to those
of the Otey case. The defendant railroad company operated
a line in Canada close to the New Hampshire boundary. A
spark emitted by an engine set fire to a bridge owned by the
plaintiff which connected the Canadian with the New Hampshire bank of the boundary creek. Reco'Ver.0 for the Canadian
half of the bridge was admittedly precluded under the law of
Canada, whose statute of limitation had expired. As to the New
Hampshire half, the plaintiff sued in New Hampshire under
the following New Hampshire statute: "The proprietors of
every railroad shall be liable for all damages to any person or
property by fire or steam from any locomotive or other engine
upon their road."
No such statutory liability without fault existed in Canada.
In discussing the applicability of the statute the court started
out with the following fictional formulation of the place-ofharm rule:
If one, while in one jurisdiction, performs a negligent [sic] act which is the proximate cause of damage to property in another jurisdiction, the locality of
the act is deemed at common law to be the same as
that of the damage.
Cases and textbook passages were cited in support of this
proposition. Nevertheless, the New Hampshire statute was
4678
N. H. 553, 103 AtI. 263 (1918).
47
Supra note 44.
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not applied. The court found that, when it enacted the
statute, "evidently" the legislature did not attempt to exercise extra-territorial control over engines operating in a foreign countrkr. This intention of the legislature was inferred
from the legislative history of the statute, which re-enacted
the following provisions of an 1840 statute:
Every railroad corporation or company now established, or which may hereafter be established within
the limits of this state, shall be deemed and held
liable to pay fully for all damages which shall hereafter accrue to any person or property within the
same, by reason of fire or steam from any locomotive
or other engine, used or to be used upon said roads
respectively, for purposes of transportation or otherwise.

48

The spatial limitation of this statute seems to be pointed
at incorporation in New Hampshire rather than at carrying
on railroad operations in the state. At any rate, the limitation was not repeated in the new statute. 'It was nevertheless read into it by the court, which simply said that no intention to repeal it could be assumed.
In spite of its holding, the case has been cited as authority
for the place-of-harm rule, not only by Beale, but also in other
places. 49 What are the bases for its dictum that as a general
rule the law of the place of harm is decisive rather than the
law of the place of acting? In support the court cited several
authorities, which are enlightening as to the origins of the
place-of-harm rule. The first of these cases, all of which are
cited without any reference to their facts, is Worster v. Winnipiseogee Lake Co.50 Land located in one county of New
Hampshire was flooded by activities carried on in another
county of the same state. The problem was whether venue
48N. H. Laws of 1840, c. 561; the re-enactment is P. S. c. 159, § 29.
49

Goodrich, op. cit. supra note 38, at p. 222, § 90; 15 C. J. S., Conflict

of Laws (1939) 899, § 12 (2); Goodrich, Tort Obligations and the Conflict of Laws, 73 Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 19, 21 (1924).
5025 N. H. 525 (1852).
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could be laid in the county where the activities were carried
on. Following the ancient doctrine that actions for harm to
land are "local" and must be brought at the place where the
land is situated, the court answered the question negatively.
The question bears an outward resemblance to the problem
of our discussion; however, as it will be shown later, 51 the
doctrine that actions for harm to land are local and must be
brought in the county and state where the land is situated
is a survival from a period when English courts had not
yet developed the technique of choice of law. Hence, a
case applying that doctrine cannot constitute a precedent
within the framework of choice of law. The policies which
lie at the bottom of the local action theory and those underlying the technique of choice of law are too different to allow
the mutual use of precedents.
The next case cited, Thompson v. Crocker,52 was likewise
concerned with a diversion of water. The plaintiff, owner of
a mill in Plymouth County, Massachusetts, claimed that the
defendant, by erecting a dam below, had backed up the water
and had thereby made the mill unworkable. The evidence
showed that the defendant's dam was in Bristol County, and
the defendant claimed that this fact amounted to a fatal variance from the declaration, in which the plaintiff had alleged
thaf he had been deprived of profits in Plymouth County.
The court decided this issue against the defendant, stating
that "the injury'done to the plaintiff's mill is the substance
of the complaint, and the place where the injury was done, to
wit, at the mills, gives the locality to the action, and not the
source from which the mischief came."
Unless one resorts to conceptual jurisprudence of the worst
type, it is difficult to see how this case can constitute a precedent for a choice-of-law case, especially when one considers
that the action was one for harm to land, and therefore a local
action in the sense just discussed.
51

See infra at p. 197.
529 Pick. 59 (Mass. 1829).
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The next case we find cited, viz. Barden v. Crocker,53 was
concerned with the same dam in Bristol County, which also
interfered with a fishing right in Plymouth County. The action was brought at the place of the fishery, and the defendant objected to the venue. This time the doctrine of local
action was ignored, the court stating that the plaintiff "may
unquestionably maintain his action in either county; in
Bristol, where the obstruction was raised, as well as in Plymouth, where the injury was sustained."
Quoting from Coke's Reports and other venerable English
authority, the court held that "when one matter in one county
is depending upon the matter in another county, the plaintiff
may choose in which county he shall bring his action."
Thompson v. Crocker was expressly overruled.
"The remark in the opinion," the court now declared,
"'that the place where the injury was done, viz. at the mills,
gives locality to the action,54 and not the source from which
the mischief came,' seems to be too much limited; the cases
above cited showing that the action could have been maintained in either county."
Out of superabundant caution the court continued to state
that even "if the case at bar should be governed by the limited
rule, it would be supported, for the plaintiff was deprived of
his fishery in the county of Plymouth; and to use the words
of Parker, C. J., 'it was wholly unnecessary to allege in what
county the obstruction was erected.'"
I The last case cited in the Connecticut Valley case is Thayer
v. Brooks.55 It too was concerned with a water diversion carried on in one place and damage to the water supply of a mill
located in another. However, this time we are nearer to the
field of choice of law, the two places having been situated in
different states, viz. Pennsylvania and Ohio respectively.
5310 Pick.

383 (Mass. 1830).
54 The court's italics.
5517 Ohio 489, 49 Am. Dec. 474 (1848).
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Action was brought in Ohio, the state where the harm was
suffered, and the defendant's plea to the jurisdiction of the
court was refuted by the now familiar argument that a local
action is to be brought at the place of the res sita. The authority invoked-was the celebrated case of Livingston v. Jefferson,56 in which the English doctrine of local action was
transplanted to the United States by no less an authority than
Chief Justice Marshall, who, sitting at the time as circuit justice, must have greatly welcomed that doctrine as an expedient to avoid deciding on the merits a case which was so
full of political gunpowder as the action brought against exPresident Jefferson by one of the most prominent Federalist
leaders. The dramatic facts of that case arose in the field of
high politics, 57 when Jefferson, shortly after the Louisiana
Purchase, ordered Livingston ejected from extensive lands in
New Orleans, to which the President claimed title as part of
the public domain. When Jefferson's term of office was over,
Livingston brought a personal action against him for damages
in the only place where personal service could be had. The
doctrine of local action, whose history was traced by Marshall
with an amount of eloquence that might well betray the Chief
Justice's doubts as to its reasonableness, afforded a Welcome
way to avoid a decision on the merits.
56

Fed. Cas. #8,411 (C. C. Va. 1811).
57The heat which was engendered by the case is reflected in the following words of District Judge Tyler, father of President Tyler, who sat
together with Chief Justice Marshall and who relieved himself of the
following oration: "While I freely acknowledge how much I was pleased

with the ingenuity and eloquence of the plaintiff's counsel, I cannot do
so much injustice to plain truth, as to say, that any conviction was
wrought on my mind, of the soundness of the arguments they exhibited
in a legal acceptation. It is the happy talent of some professional gentlemen, and particularly of the plaintiff's counsel (Mr. Wickham), often to
make 'the worse appear the better cause'; but it is the duty of the judge

to guard against the effects intended to be produced, by selecting those
arguments and principles from the mass afforded as will enable him to
give such an opinion at least, as may satisfy himself, if not others. These
arguments and this eloquence, however, have been met by an Herculean
strength of forensic ability, which, I take pride in saying, sheds lustre
over the bar of Virginia." For a detailed story of the controversy see
Hatcher, Edward Livingston (1940) ch. 8.
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We thus find that the Connecticut Valley case, first, does
not apply the place-of-harm rule, and, second, adduces, when
it.mentions that rule, as authority for it, cases which are exclusively concerned with the problem of whether an action for
a trespass to land can be brought in any place other than the
situs of the land. Among these cases there is cited, without
distinction and as allegedly supporting the place-of-harm rule,
a case which not only declares that an action for trespass to
land must not necessarily be brought at the place where the
harm occurred, but which also expressly overrules another
case, also cited in the Connecticut Valley case, which had expressed that doctrine!
In Cameron v. Vandergriff,58 an Arkansas court allowed
recovery for personal injuries caused by blasting operations.
The very brief opinion of the supreme court of the state is
exclusively concerned with general problems of negligence.
Only at the very end does it say: "The rock which occasioned
the injury was put in motion by the appellants in the Indian
Territory; but, by the same force, its motion was continued,
and the injury done in this state. The cause of action arose
here."
This is all.
thorities.

There is neither discussion nor citation of au-

Moore v. Pywell 9 is cited by Beale as authority for the
proposition that "where a person is injured by being caused
to take by mistake or fraud some poisonous or deleterious
substance which causes injury after being taken, the place of
the wrong is the place where the substance first caused harm
to the person of the person injured." 60 Does it stand for this
proposition?
5859 Ark. 381, 13 S. W. 1092 (1890). The case is stated as authority
for the place-of-harm rule also by Goodrich, op. cit. supra note 38, at
p. 222, § 90; 15 C.J.S., Conflict of Laws (1939) 899, § 12 (2) ; Goodrich,
loe. cit. supra note 49; Annotation, 56 L. R. A. 193, 217.
5929 App. D. C. 312, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1078 (1907).
602 Beale, op. cit. supra note 4, at p. 1288, §377.2; see also Restatement of Conflict of Laws (1934) § 377, n. 2. The case is also cited in 11
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The action was one for death by negligent act. The administrator of the estate of the decedent filed an action in the
District of Columbia against a druggist who had allegedly
caused the death by negligently filling a prescription. At the
trial the plaintiff's evidence tended to prove that the defendant, while in the District of Columbia, had committed an
error and that the patient, after taking the medicine at his
home in Maryland, had died there. The defendant moved to
direct a verdict on the ground that the evidence did not tend
to show "an injury done and happening within the limits of
the District of Columbia," as alleged in the declaration, but in
the State of Maryland, whose law was not pleaded. The ruling of the trial court amounted to a denial of the plaintiff's
motion to amend his declaration by pleading the death statutes
of both the District of Columbia and Maryland, and to the
direction of a verdict for the defendant. The Court of*Appeals of the District reversed the judgment and remanded
the case for a new trial, holding that the trial court should
have allowed the amendment and that it had improperly interpreted the death statute of the District of Columbia.
The opinion turns upon two arguments, each of which alone
would have sufficed to decide the case. The -first part opens
with a discussion of Mr. Justice Brewer's decision in Stewart
v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co.61 In that case a death action was
brought in the District of Columbia, both the death-causing
conduct and the death having occurred in Maryland. The trial
court as well as the court of appeals denied the action on the
ground that the case was to be decided under the law of Maryland, whose death statute provided for a procedure which
could not be followed in the District of Columbia. The United
States Supreme Court reversed this decision, holding that an
action for wrongful death had its origin not in any statute but
in the tort committed; that the statutes did no more than remove the obstacle to recovery that resulted from the rule,
Am. Jur., Conflict of Laws (1937) 493, § 182; 15 C. J. S., Conflict of
Laws (1939) 899, § 12(2).
61168 U. S. 445, 18 Sup. Ct. 105, 42 L. Ed. 537 (1897).
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"actio personalis moritur cur persona"; and that, in any
event, the death statute of Maryland was not so different
from that of the District of Columbia as to exclude in the District a recovery upon a Maryland statute.
From this decisioji the court in Moore v. Pywell concluded
that there existed no reason why the action should not be
brought in the District of Columbia, "where the negligence
which caused the death of appellant's intestate happened."
"We are of opinion," the court continued, "that the wrongful
act alleged to have been committed in this District, and to
have resulted in death therefrom in Maryland, is actionable
in this District in which the wrongful act was .committed.
While the action lies to recover damages for death, the gist of
this action for the tort is the wrongful act itself, resulting in
death. The place of death ought not to determine the existence
or nonexistence of a cause of action."

-

This passage is followed by a reference to Van Doren v.
Pennsylvania R. Co. 62 and Rudiger v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0.
Ry. Co., 63 cases, which were concerned with a problem different from that raised in Moore v. Pywell. In the latter case
the court had to choose between the place of acting and that
place where both the first injury and the death occurred. In
the other two cases the choice was between the place where
both the actor acted and the injury was received, on the one
hand, and the place where the death occurred, on the other;
64
and the decision was in favor of the former.
6293 Fed. 260 (C. C. A. 3d 1899).

Wis. 191, 68 N. W. 661 (1896).
spite of this holding, these and similar cases are not regarded by
the advocates of the place-of-harm rule as incompatible with their approach. They argue that the existence or nonexistence of a cause of action being determined by the law of the place where the first harm
occurs, death constitutes but a subsequent result and that, therefore, the
place of the death is irrelevant. See 2 Beale, op. cit. supra note 4, at
p. 1305, § 391.1; Restatement of Conflict of Laws (1934) § 377, n. 1,
§ 391, Comment (c). This argument would be conclusive if it referred to
the cause of action by which the person harmed seeks to recover for the
harm suffered by him and whicl either abates upon his death or survives
to his personal representative under a survival statute. The argument
6394

64

1n
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The tort, which is the gist of the action, is negligence, unlawful violence or a wrongful act proximately causing personal injury resulting in death.
While the action lies to recover damages for death,
death does not constitute the tort. The fact of death
is not the tort, but its consequence. Negligence, unlawful violence or a wrongful act is the tort, although
death must result from injury caused by such negligence, violence or act before the statutory cause of
action accrues. 65
It is not made of the substance of the right of action that the death should have occurred within the
state, but the gist and substance of the provision is
that the death shall have been caused by a wrongful
act, neglect, or default occurring in this state; but in
what state the damages ensued thereon was not, we
think, intended to be made material.... The foundation of the action is obviously the wrongful or negligent act or default which caused the injury, and
which is in contravention of the law of the state.
This, as we have said, is the substantive ground of
action. 66
If the court which decided Moore v. Pywell had stopped at
this point, its decision would constitute a clear authority for
a rule directly opposite to that which the case has been cited
as supporting. However, the court continued to discuss at
length the second assignment of the appellant, who maintained
does not properly apply, however, to the new and independent cause of

action by which the survivors seek to recover for the harm suffered by
them in consequence of the death of their provider or relative. For this
cause of action the death must be regarded as "the last event necessary
to make an actor liable." Of this difference the court that had to decide
Moore v. Pywell was obviously unaware, having been misled by the inaccurate language of the earlier cases.
65
Van Doren v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 93 Fed. 260, 264 (C. C. A. 3d
1899).
66
Rudiger v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry. Co., 94 Wis. 191, 194, 196,
68 N. W. 661, 662 (1896).
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that the lower court should have allowed him to amend his
declaration by pleading the death statutes of both Maryland
and the District of Columbia. The court of appeals held that
under the rules of procedure of the federal courts, the amendment should have been allowed, and that the .lower court
should even have taken judicial notice of the Maryland statute. But why was the Maryland statute relevant at all if the
law applicable was that of the District of Columbia? The
court's ideas are to some extent made understandable by'its
reference to Foot v. Edwards,6 7 and its renewed reference to
the Stewart case.68 In Foot v. Edwards, action was brought
in Connecticut on an alleged diversion of a stream in that
state, in consequence of which the plaintiff's mill in Massachusetts was deprived of water. In affirming its jurisdiction, the court in Connecticut made the following statement:
The commission or omission of an act by the defendant, and damage to the plaintiff in consequence
thereof, must unite to give him a good cause of action. No one of these facts by itself is a cause of action against the defendant ...

A part of that which

is essential to the plaintiffs' right to recover took
place in Connecticut .... The act of diversion, which
arose in Connecticut, and the other facts existing,
give to the plaintiffs a cause of action., That which
is essential, therefore, to the plaintiffs' right of recovery against anyone, or their cause of action, arose
where the suit has been brought.
On this basis the District of Columbia court in Moore v.
Pywell said:
If the prescription had been filled in Maryland,
and the medicine had been given there and had
caused the death there, and yet under the principle
announced in the Stewart case, this plaintiff could
have maintained his action for such tort here, what
67Fed Cas. #4,908
OSSupra note 61.

(C. C. Conn. 1855).
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reason of public policy, what principle of law, should
lead us to deny the benefit of these remedial statutes
solely because the prescription was filled here, negligently, and carried to Maryland, and, when the medicine was taken there, it caused the death of the
plaintiff's intestate in that state? We are convinced
that, if the wrongful act alleged to have been done
here caused the death in Maryland, that circumstance
does not only not forbid a recovery, but affords an
additionalground for maintaining it in this District.
(Italics ours.)
The court to which the case was remanded must have been
embarrassed when it was told that it could apply the death
statutes of both the District of Columbia and of Maryland
simultaneously. However, this task is less formidable when,
as in the Stewart case, death statutes are regarded not as
creating new statutory causes of action but as merely removing an obstacle to an action already given by the common
law. This approach becomes even more understandable when
we consider that in 1907, when Moore v. Pywell was decided,
much favor was given to the notion that in questions of the
general common law it was unnecessary to determine which
particular state's law should be applicable. The doctrine of
Swift v. Tyson 9 was the accepted law in the federal courts.
This lengthy inquiry was necessary to determine the importance of Moore v. Pywell as a precedent. In Beale's treatise, and consequently, in the Restatement, it figures as an
authority for the place-of-harm doctrine. If it can be taken
as an authority for anything, it is the opposite doctrine which
adjudges problems of the law of torts primarily under the
law of the place where the alleged tort-feasor was acting.
6916 Pet. 1, 10 L. Ed. 865 (U. S. 1842). Cf. Stumberg, op. cit. supra
note 22, at p. 161: "The federal courts in diversity of citizenship cases,

upon a so-called doctrine of general jurisprudence, often disregard the
common law of the state where the tort occurred and apply their own
rules."

See also 2 Wharton, Conflict of Laws (Parmele's 3d ed. 1905)

§ 478b, n. 14.
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There remains-of Beale's cases only Keeler v. Fred T. Ley
& Co.,7 0 with respect to which he says:
So in an action for fraud by which the defendant
induced the plaintiff to sell to the defendant the
plaintiffs' land, it appeared that the land was in one
state while the false representations were used [sic]
in another state. It was held that the place of the
fraud was the place where the property was actually
obtained by the fraud, that being the injury to the
plaintiffs' estate which the action for fraud is in71
tended to redress.
When we look at the two opinions which were rendered in
the Keeler case by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals,
First .Circuit, we find that the land in question was located in
Albany, New York, but that no word whatever was said about
the place where the fradulent representations were made. The
facts as stated render it quite probable that the fraudulent
statements were made in New York, too. At any rate, we are
not told anything on the point. The only statement made by the
court with respect to the law applicable is the following laconic
statement: "The case is to be governed by the law of New
York ... 72 We have no occasion to determine whether the
law of Massachusetts is in any way different."
7049 F. (2d) 872 (C. C. A. 1st 1931); 65 F.

(2d)'499 (C. C. A. 1st

1933).
71§
72

377.2.

Here the court cites James-Dickinson Farm Mortgage Co. v. Harry,
273 U. S. 119, 47 Sup. Ct. 308, 71 L. Ed. 569 (1927) and Huntington v.
Attrill, 146 U. S. 657, 13 Sup. Ct. 224, 36 L. Ed. 1123 (1892). In the
former of these two cases an action was brought in a federal court in
Illinois, for harm suffered by the plaintiff in Texas in consequence of
his reliance upon fraudulent statements of the defendant's made in
Texas. It was held that the case was to be decided under Texas law
and that a particular statute of Texas was not of a penal character and
was, therefore, not excluded from application by a court in another state.
The case of Huntington v. Attrill has long been occupying a prominent
place in casebooks and texts on conflict of laws as a leading case on the
definition of "penal law" within the meaning of the conflict of laws.
Attrill, as director of a New York corporation, signed a certificate
falsely stating that all the sfock of the corporation had been paid in.
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On what ground the Massachusetts law was mentioned 73 is
not stated. Perhaps the defendant had sought to derive some
benefit from the law of Massachusetts on the ground that it
was the law of the place of its official seat of business; perhaps it had appeared in some part of the evidence not referred
to in the published report, that indeed, all or some of the
fraudulent statements had been made in Massachusetts; or,
most probably, the Massachusetts law was simply referred to
as the lex fori. But we are not told, and as the case is reported the fraudulent allegations were more probably made
in New York than in Massachusetts. It was in New York
City that Ley, the president and general manager of the defendant corporation, resided and had his business office at
the relevant time.7 4
For the proposition that the place of wrong is always located at the place of harm the cases so far considered are
neither numerous nor convincing. But the lack of more impressive case authority in Beale's treatise might perhaps be
A creditor of the corporation in New York obtained a judgment against
him under a statute of New York which rendered him personally liable.
When the Maryland courts refused to enforce it, the United States Supreme Court held that the New York statute was not of 'Penal character
and that, therefore, the refusal of the Maryland courts to enforce the
New York judgment violated the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution of the United States. Huntington v. Attrill has nothing to do
with the problem of determining the law applicable to a claim for fraud
and deceit, and neither Huntington v. Attrill nor James-Dickinson Co. v.
Harry has anything to do with multiple contact torts.
73The opinion in 65 F. (2d) 499, 501 (1933) simply repeats the first
sentence, without the rest of the quotation.
74
The same transactions which gave rise to the controversy decided in
Keeler v. Fred T. Ley & Co., formed the basis of the action in the case
of Ernest F. Carlson Co. v. Fred T. Ley & Co., 269 Mass. 272, 168 N. E.
812 (1929). The decision in that case is equally silent as to the place of
the fraudulent allegations. The facts stated in the two opinions are too
meager even to allow us to regard the court's omission of the place where
the fraudulent allegations were made as an indication that it took the
place-of-harm rule for granted and therefore regarded the place of acting as irrelevant. As the case stands, it is not only possible but even
probable that the law of New York was apodictically declared applicable
not as the law of the place of harm as opposed to the law of the place of
acting, but simply as the law of the place of wrong as opposed to the law
of Massachusetts as the lex foHr.
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explained on two grounds: upon the author's conviction of
the unassailable truth of the theories of territoriality and
vested right, from which the place-of-harm rule is derived as
a logical necessity; and upon his belief that the place-of-harm
rule actually constituted the accepted rule of American law.
The first ground holds no weight for anyone who approaches
choice-of-law cases with a different viewpoint; whether the
second is tenable needs investigation.
It cannot be denied that the place-of-harm rule has been
stated as established law in several texts 75 and in a searchbook enjoying great popularity with the legal profession. 7
But other search-books of equal popularity were silent as to
our problem, 77 and W. W. Cook and Lorenzen had attacked
the indiscriminate resort to the law of the place of harm
78
during the very time the Restatement was under discussion.
Since the publication of the Restatement, its rule has found
its way into two new search-books, where the Restatement
constitutes the principal authority. 79 However, new criticisms have been voiced in scholarly writing80 In such a state
75

Minor, Conflict of Laws (1901) 482; Wharton, op. cit. supra note
69, at p. 1105; Goodrich, op. cit. spra note 38, at p. 222, § 90; Goodrich, loc. cit. supra note 49.
765 R. C. L. 1039, based upon an annotation in 56 L. R. A. 193, 216.
77The article, Private International Law, in 22 Am. and Eng. Enc.
Law (2d ed. 1902) 1314, 1378, 1381, contains a general statement that in
problems of torts a court ought to apply the lex loci delicti rather than
the lex fon, but nothing is said as to the location of the locus delicti
except for a brief statement that actions for torts to land are local and
must be brought at the situs. The article, Conflict of Laws, in 12
C. J. (1917) 427 says nothing with reference to our problem.
78Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 Yale
L. Jour. 457 (1924); Lorenzen, Tort Liability and the Conflict of Laws,
47 L. Quar. Rev. 483 (1931).
7911 Am. Jur., Conflict of Laws (1937) 493,
182; 15 C. J. S., Conflict of Laws (1939) 899-900, § 12(2).
sStumberg, op cit. supra note 22, at p. 163 et seq.; Cook, Tort Liability and the Conflict of Laws, 35 Col. L. Rev. 202 (1935); Lorenzen
and Heilman, loc. cit. supra note 22, at p. 577; Comment, 44 Yale L.
Jour. 1233, 1236 (1935).. In Hancock, op. cit. supra note 31, § 54, several cases dealing with our problem are brought together. This section
is stated by the author to contain "a number of miscellaneous multiple
contact problems, none of which is sufficiently important to deserve a
separate section," and in which no conclusions of the author's are drawn.
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of affairs the place-of-harm rule could be regarded as established only if the cases stated in its support constituted unquestionable and well-considered authority. The cases scrutinized so far can hardly be said to fulfill this requirement.
But we still have to scrutinize the cases invoked for the rule
by other authors.
Foremost among them is Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Carroll,81
a case which has found a place in numerous texts.8 2 A railroad employee was injured in Mississippi through the break
of a link between two cars. Suing in Alabama, he alleged
that the accident was caused by another employee's failure to
discover the latent defect at an inspection in Alabama. The
railroad pleaded the fellow-servant rule, which was in force
in Mississippi but had been abolished in Alabama. Holding
for the defendant, the court said:
It is admitted, or at least cannot be denied, that
negligence of duty unproductive of damnifying results will not authorize or support a recovery. Up to
the time this train passed out of Alabama no injury
had resulted. For all that occurred in Alabama,
therefore, no cause of action whatever arose. The
fact which created the right to sue, the injury, without which confessedly no action would lie anywhere,
transpired in the state of Mississippi. It was in that
state, therefore, necessarily that the cause of action,
if any, arose; and whether a cause of action arose
and existed at all, or not, must in all reasonbe determined by the law which obtained at the time and
place when and where the fact which is relied on to
justify a recovery transpired. (Italics ours.)
8197 Ala. 126, 11 So. 803 (1892).
82 Minor, op. cit. supra note 75; Stumberg, op. cit. supra note 22, at
pp. 165, 169, 170; Goodrich, op. cit. supra note 38, at p. 222, § 90; 11
Am. Jur., Conflict of Laws (19N') 493, §. 182; 15 C. J. S., Conflict of
Laws (1939) 900, § 12(2); Lorenzen, loc. cit. supra note 78, at p. 491;
Annotation, 56 L. R. A. 193, 217; 5 R. C. L. 1039.
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The basic idea of the court is contained in these few sentences, after which is found the following amplification:
Section 2590 of the Code of Alabama had no efficacy beyond the lines of Alabama. It cannot be
allowed to operate upon facts occurring in another
state, so as to evolve out of them rights and liabilities
which do not exist under the law of that state, which
is of course paramount in the premises.
In addition to this formalistic argumentation, we find references to the following two cases: The Nashville, Chattanooga
& St. Louis Railway v. Foster 3 and Chicago, St. Louis and
4
New Orleans Railroad Company v. Dolye.8
The former case was similar to the Carroll case. A railroad employee suffered a fatal accident in Alabama, which
was alleged to have been caused by a negligent brake inspection in Tennessee. Without discussion the Tennessee court
held that the decision was to be rendered under the law of
Alabama, the only relevant statement being contained in this
single sentence: "There is no question but the laws of Alabama at the time the deceased was killed, controlled the rights
of the parties..
"
For this apodictical statement no reason is given and no
authority is cited.
In the Doyle case, a train engineer was killed in a collision
in Tennessee. While some allegation was made that the negligence of a fellow-servant, which caused the collision, had
occurred in Mississippi, nothing in the decision indicates that
the fellow-servant rules of the two states were different.
Apart from the question of whether the general fellow-servant
rule applied under the circumstances, the only problem was
whether an action could be had at the forum (Mississippi)
upon a death occurring in another state. What the court had
to say is this:
8310 Lea 282 (Tenn. 1882):
8460

Miss. 977 (1883).
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The right of action for damages for killing a husband given by the statute of Tennessee may be asserted in the courts of this State, because of the coincidence of the statutes of the two States on this point,
and, independently of this, because a right of action
created by the statute of another State, of a transitory nature, may be enforced here, when it does not
conflict with the public policy of this State to permit
its enforcement, and our statute is evidence that our
policy is favorable to such rights of action instead of
being inimical to them ... The right of the appellee
is determinable by the law of Tennessee, in which
State the killing of her husband occurred. The view
that no recovery could be had here, except for a result traceable to an omission of duty in Mississippi
is unfounded. Physical force proceeding from this
State and inflicting injury in another State might
give rise to an action in either State, and vice versa;
but the omission of some duty in Mississippi cannot
transfer a consequence of it manifested physically in
another State to Mississippi. The cases of injuries
commenced in one jurisdiction and completed in another illustrate our view on this subject. The true
view is that the legal entity called the corporation is
omnipresent on its railroad, and the presence or absence of negligence with respect to an occurrence at
any point of the line is not to be resolved by the place
at which any officer or employee was stationed for
duty. The question is as to duty operating effectually at the place where its alleged failure caused
harm to result. The locality of the collision was in
Tennessee. It was there, if anywhere, that the company was remiss in duty, for there is where its proper caution should have been used.
Again, the argumentation is purely conceptual and fails to
state authority as well as intelligible reasons.
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An additional clue, however, is, afforded by the opinion of
the Carroll case itself. The plaintiff's attorney had cited an
Alabama case 8 5 in which it was held that a murderer might
be prosecuted and punished where the fatal blow was delivered, irrespective of where death ensued. This argument
was answered by the court in the following sentences:
This principle is patently without application here.
There would be some analogy if the plaintiff had
been stricken in Alabama and suffered in Mississippi,
which is not the fact. There is, however, an analogy
which is afforded by the criminal law, but which
points away from the conclusion appellee's counsel
desire us to reach. This is found in that well-established doctrine of the criminal law that where the
unlawful act is committed in one jurisdiction or
state, and takes effect-produces the result which it
is the purpose of the law to prevent, or, it having ensued, punish for-in another jurisdiction or state, the
crime is deemed to have been committed and is punished in that jurisdiction or state in which the result
is manifested, and not where the act was committed.
1 Bish. Crim. Law, § 110 et seq.; 1 Bish. Crim.
Proc. § 53 et seq.
This reference to the "well-established doctrine of the
criminal law," which we shall meet again, is more important
than its seemingly insignificant role in the Carroll case appears to indicate.
Another case which one encounters in case-books and texts
is Le Forest v. Tolman. 6 The defendant lived in Massachusetts, close to the New Hampshire line. His dog strayed into
New Hampshire and there bit the plaintiff. Scienter, required for holding the defendant liable at common law, could
85
Green v. State, 66 Ala. 40 (1880). See Alabama G. S. R. Co. v.
Carroll, 97 Ala. 126, 11 So. 803, 807 (1892).
86117 Mass. 109 (1875). It is cited in Stumberg, op. cit. supra note
22, at pp. 165, 167, 168, 183, 184; Goodrich, op. cit. supra note 38, at p.
221; Annotation, 56 L. R. A. 193, 217.
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not be proved. However, the plaintiff pleaded a Massachusetts statute which declared a dog owner liable without such
proof. In an opinion marked for brevity, Chief Justice Gray
refused to apply the Massachusetts statute. All he had to say
on the point was this:
This statute is not a penal but a remedial statute,
giving all the damages to the person injured. Mitchell
v. Clapp, 12 Cush. 278. It does not declare the owning or keeping of a dog to be unlawful, but that if
the dog injures another person, the owner or keeper
shall be liable, without regard to the question
whether he had or had not a license to keep the dog.
The wrong done to the person injured consists not in
the act of the master in owning or keeping, or neglecting to restrain, the dog, but in the act of the dog
for which the master is responsible.
These words make it clear that the case does not constitute
a precedent for the place-of-harm doctrine, which does not
come into play in any cases other than those where the place
of conduct and the place of harm are situated in different
jurisdictions. In the conception of Chief Justice Gray, the
place of wrongful conduct and that of the harm were both
in the same state.
To complete the list of cases which one encounters in the
texts and search-books as authority for the place-of-harm
rule we still have to consider several cases which are adduced
in the most recent search-book, viz. the fifteenth volume of
Corpus Juris Secundum.8 7 In addition to our old friends, the
Carroll case, 88 the Connecticut Valley case,8 9 the Otey case, 90
the Keeler case, 9' Cameron v. Vandergriff,92 and Moore v.
8

At pp. 899-900, § 12(2).

8

SSupra note 81.

89
Supra
90

note 46.
Supra note 44.

91

Supra note 70.

92

Supra note 58.
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Pywell,93 we find the cases discussed in the following paragraphs:
Kristansen v. Steinfeld"94 belongs to a group of cases about
which we shall have more to say later on. A dock worker,
while on board ship, was fatally injured by a force which had
been set in motion by a person standing on land. The New
York state court, in which the action for damages was
brought, held that it was without jurisdiction, the case properly belonging to the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal
courts. That cases of this type cannot properly be used as
precedents in the choice-of-law cases, will be shown later.
Dallas v. Whitney9 5 was concerned with a situation analogous to that of Cameron v. VandergrifP6 : 'blasting operations
carried on in one state, viz. West Virginia, caused harm to the
plaintiff's house situated in another state, viz. Ohio. Simply
citing the Cameron case, the article in Ruling Case LawOT and
the treatises of Beale and Goodrich, the court repeated the
place-of-harm rule and decided the case accordingly.
Conklin v. Canadian-ColonialAi ways 8 has nothing to do
with the problem for which it is cited. A passenger was killed
in an airplane accident which happened in New Jersey. When
sued in New York, the airline sought to limit its liability in
accordance with a clause on the ticket, which had been sold
in New York. Applying New York law as the law of the contract, the court held the clause invalid.
The cases discussed in the following paragraphs, together
with the Carroll case, are cited in Corpus Juris Secundum for
the propositions that in death actions the lex loci delicti is
the place where the accident occurred, and that the right to
recover for death depends upon the law of the place of the act
93

Supra note 59.

300 N. Y. S. 543 (1937).
95118 W. Va. 106, 188 S. E. 766 (1936).
96
Supra note 58.
97See su4ra note 82.
98266 N. Y. 244, 194 N. E. 692 (1935).
94165 Misc. 575,

HeinOnline -- 19 Tul. L. Rev. 186 1944-1945

1944]

PLACE OF WRONG

or omission that caused it, the place where the first injury
was sustained, and not upon the law of the place where death
occurred:
Kansas City Ft. S. & M. R. Co. v. Becke 9 9 and St. Louis,
1. M. & S. By. Co. v. Brown'0 0 seem, upon the facts, to be
similar to the Carroll case. However, the problem actually
discussed in the Becker case was whether the claim of an injured railroad employee was based upon tort or contract. This
problem also appeared in the Carroll case, where it was held
that the employee's claim was to be characterized exclusively
as a tort claim. In the Becker case it was held, however, that
the employee had a power of selection between suing on the
contract on the one hand, and waiving his contractual claim
and suing in tort on the other. The accident had happened in
Arkansas, and the question of whether an act of negligence
had occurred was an issue of fact. That such an act, if it
occurred at all, would have occurred in Missouri, is mentioned
as a factual circumstance, but the opinion does not contain any
discussion of the problem of choosing between the law of the
place of harm and the law of the place of conduct. It cannot
even be said that the former law was impliedly held to be applicable by the court. The plaintiff in his declaration had
simply stated that an accident had happened to him in Arkansas, the state where he brought his action, and only when
the defendant denied that any negligence had occurred did it
appear that some conduct had been carried on in Missouri.
Neither party used this newly raised factual allegation for a
claim that Missouri law should be applied.
In the Brown case, 1'0 a railroad employee suffered an accident in the Indian territory; the action was brought in Arkansas. The railroad company, alleging that the accident was
caused through the negligence of a fellow-servant in Kansas,
claimed that the law of that state should apply. The court,
9967 Ark. 1, 53 S. W. 406, 46 L. R. A. 814, 77 Am. St. Rep. 78 (1899).
4 S. W. 865 (1899); the two cases also appear in
Annotation, 56 L. R. A. 193, 217.
'O1 Supr note 100.
10067- Ark. 295,
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stating that the common law was presumed to he equally in
force both in Kansas and the Indian Territory, held that the
common law allowed the defendant to invoke the fellow-servant rule under the circumstances of the case. By way of additional argument the court expressed itself as follows:
In all actions ex delicto for injuries to person or
property... the right to recover, and the limit of the
amount of judgment, are, determined and governed
by the laws of the place where the injury wag done
The injury in this case was done in the Indian
...
Territory. The common law was in force in that
country at that time.
Whatever weight one might be inclined to ascribe to this
dictum is destroyed by the court's reference to two cases which
had nothing to do with the problem but simply held that in
tort cases a court had to apply the lex loci delicti rather than
10 2
the lex fori.
Melton's Adm'r v. Southern Ry. Co. 10 3 was concerned with
the problem of whether in an action for wrongful death venue
was to be laid in the state where the death occurred or in the
state where the accident happened; the question was answered
in favor of the latter. With the proposition in support of
which the case is cited, it has nothing to do.
Darks v. Scudders-Gale Grocer Co..0 4 presented a factual
situation of some surface similarity to that with which the.
Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia had to deal in
Moore v. Pywell.1° 5 A wholesale grocer in St. Louis, Missouri,
sold a grocer in Oklahoma a product which was labelled as
ginger -extract. The Oklahoma grocer drank from one of the
bottles and died shortly thereafter. The extract, it turned out,
contained poisonous wood alcohol. There were numerous islo2 N'orthern Pac. R. Co. v. BAbrcbck, 154 U. S. 190, 14 Sup. Ct. 978, 38
L. Ed. 958 (1894) - Carter v. Goad, 50 Ark. 155, 6 S. W. 719 (1888).
103236 Ky. 629, 33 S. W. (2d) 690 (1930).
104146 Mo. App. 246, 130 S. W. 430 (1910).
5
0oSupra note 59.
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sues of fact and law, the principal one being that of determining whether a wholesaler was responsible even though he had
not himself manufactured and labelled a dangerous drug bearing a harmless label. Drawing on precedents from numerous
jurisdictions without indicating in any way which state law
governed the decision, the Missouri appellate court answered
the question affirmatively. The only choice-of-law problem expressly raised and discussed as such was that of determining
whether the statutory maximum amount of damages for wrongful death was that of the statute of Missouri, where the defendant carried on his business, or that of Oklahoma, where the decedent had taken the poisonous drink. In one short sentence the
court declared the latter law applicable, simply citing Wharton
on Conflict of Laws, 10 6 the Carrollcase, 10 7 Cameron v. Vandergiff, 05 1 Rundell v. La Compqgnie G6ngrale Transatlantique,
an admiralty case of which we shall have to speak, 10 9 Northern
Pacific R. R. Co. v. Babcock,'" and the Brown case," both of
which have just been discussed.
Of the remaining six cases cited in Corpus Juris Secundum,
2
none has anything to do with our problem."
1060p. cit. supra note 69, at p. 1129.
' 0 7Supra note 81.
08
Supra note 58.
10See infra note 113.
1oSupra note 102.
1USzpra note 100.
"1 2 They are the following: Vancouver S. S. Co. v. Rice, 288 U. S.
445, 53 Sup. Ct. 420, 77 L. Ed. 885 (1933) (demarcation between "land"

and admiralty law when accident happened on board ship and death
occurred on land); Betts v. Southern Ry. Co., 71 F. (2d) 7&7 (C. C. A.
4th 1934) (determination of person entitled to bring a death claim by

the workmen's compensation act of the place where the contract of hire
was made or by the act of the place where the accident occurred);
Hoodmacher v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 218 Pa. 21, 66 Atl. 975 (907) (law
of place of accident or of place of death) ; Oberholzer v. Oberholzer, 12
Pa. Dist. & Cty. Rep. 271 (1928)

(institution in Pennsylvania of action

for New York accident and proper'law applicable); Rositzky v. Rositzky,
329 MIo. 662, 46 S. W. (2d) 591 (1931) (institution in Missouri of action
for wrongful death in Iowa); Stewart's Adm'x v. Bacon, 253 Ky. 748,

70 S.W. (2d) 522 (1934) (institution in Kentucky of action for wrongful death in Canada).

HeinOnline -- 19 Tul. L. Rev. 189 1944-1945

TULANE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XIX

Of the cases alleged to support the place-of-harm rule there
remains only one more for scrutiny, viz. RundeU v. La Com"
pagnie Ggn6rale Transatlantique.11 3 A French passenger boat
became involved in a collision on the high seas and sank, as
a result of which numerous lives were lost. The survivors of
an American passenger who had lost his life in the catastrophe
sued the shipping company, alleging that the collision was
caused by negligent navigation. The company pleaded that
claims for wrongful death were unknown to the general maritime law as applied in American courts and that the French
wrongful death statute could not be applied unless it were
proved that the passenger was injured while he was still on
board the French ship. The court upheld this defense, stating
that, in the absence of proof, it was more- logical to assume
that the passenger had come to death by drowning in the
high seas rather than by some event occurring on board ship.
"The damage is the substance . . .of the injury," the court
stated, "and from that alone springs the right of recovery."
On its face, this sentence seems to constitute a clear expression of the place-of-harm rule, but let us see which precedents
served the court as authorities for its shocking decision.
The first of them is The Plymouth, 1 4 a case of great fame
in the field of admiralty. While a ship was lying at a pier in
the Chicago River, a fire was started through the negligent
conduct of some member of the crew. The fire sprang to the
shore and caused damage to the plaintiff's warehouse and
the goods stored therein. The plaintiff brought a libel in the
federal district court which, however, denied that admiralty
jurisdiction extended to the case. This decision was ultimately affirmed by the United States Supreme Court. Speaking through Mr. Justice Nelson, the court stated that admiralty jurisdiction over marine torts depended upon locality,
113100 Fed. 655, 49 L. R. A. 92 (C.C. A. 7th 1900) ; it occupies a conspicuous position in the Annotation in 56 L. R. A. 193, 217, which has
played such a prominent role in the history of the alleged place-of-harm
rule; it is also quoted as the most prominent authority in 11 Am. Jur.,
Conflict of Laws (1937) 493, § 182.
-1143 Wall. 20, 18 L. Ed. 125 (U. S. 1865).
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and that a marine tort was characterized not by the fact that
the harm-creating activity was carried on upon the navigable
waters but by the fact that the harm occurred on the water
rather than on land.
One of the cases discussed was United States v. Davis,115 a
decision rendered by Mr. Justice Story as circuit justice.
While an American ship was anchored in Raiatea Harbor in
the Society Islands, a despotical captain provoked a mutiny;
firing a shot, he accidentally killed a man who was standing
on board a native boat. The captain was indicted in the federal court in Boston under the federal Crime Act of 1790, by
which jurisdiction over crimes committed on board American
vessels on the high seas was given to the federal admiralty
courts. In addition to the defense that Raiatea Harbor was
not a part of the high seas, the prisoner pleaded that the offense was not committed on board the American vessel where
the shot was fired, but on board the other vessel where the bullet hit the victim. Leaving open the first problem, whose decision was said to depend upon delicate questions of topography, Story held that the crime
if any, was committed not on board of the American
ship Rose; but on board of a foreign schooner belongingto inhabitants of theSociety Islands, and of course,
under the territorial government of the King of Society Islands, with which kingdom we have trade, and
friendly intercourse, and which our government may
be presumed (since we have a consul there) to recognize as entitled to the rights and sovereignty of an
independent nation, and of course entitled to try offenses committed within its territorial jurisdiction
... The act was, in contemplation of law, done where
the shot took effect. So the' law was settled in the
case of Rex v. Coombes," 6 1 Leach 388 where a person
on the high seas was killed by a shot fired by a per11

Fed Cas. #14,932 (C. C. Mass. 1837).
1161 Leach 388, 168 Eng. Rep. 296 (1785).
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son on shore, and the offence was held to be [sic]
committed on the high seas, and to be within the
admiralty jurisdiction.
Here, it seems, we have reached one of the very fountainheads of the place-of-harm doctrine: one of the earliest American cases concerned with marking off the criminal jurisdiction of the federal admiralty courts from the jurisdiction of
the state courts over land crimes, a case which was decided
by one of the most influential of all American judges; a case
which was based on a venerable precedent of no less an English court than the Exchequer Chamber; a case which, in
turn, had been influenced by decisions on jurisdiction over
crimes in general, and which has nothing at all to do with
choice of law in the sense of the conflict of laws. The
other fountainhead, it will be remembered, was constituted
by Livingston v. Jefferson,117 a case which, transplanting

to the United States the obsolete doctrine of local action, has
equally little to do with choice of law. Finally a third fountainhead is found in that combination of territorialism and
the vested rights theory, whose portentous American career
extends from the Treatise on Conflict of Laws by- the same
Joseph Story who decided the admiralty case of United States
v. Davis to Joseph Beale and the Restatement.
This historical connection is neatly illustrated by Minor's
treatise on conflict of laws, published in 1901, which seems
to be the earliest American treatise expressly dealing with the
problem of this article. On Pages 481-482, it is axiomatically
stated that "where the injury is the result of a series of acts,
some of which occur in one state, while the culmination takes
place in another ...

the rule in such cases is that the place

where the liability of the perpetrator first becomes fixed is
the locus delicti, or situs of the tort."
As authorities, we are referred to the Carroll c4se l l s and
ii 7 Suprac note 56.
iiSSupra note 81.
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the Doyle case ;119 Cincinnati,H. & D. R. Co. v. McMullen 120
and Lousiana 4-N. R. Co. v. Williams 1 1 are introduced with a
"but see." "For analogous principles with respect to crimes"
the reader is referred in a revealing footnote to the appropriate section of the book.
The precedents cited are meager. However, they are hardly important within the context of Minor's book, where the
place-of-harm theory appears as a self-evident conclusion from
the territoriality-vested rights approach, by which the whole
22
book is permeated.
Such admiralty cases as that of The Plymouth123 appear to
be quite similar to conflict of laws cases. They seem to be concerned with the conflict between the law of the land on the
one side and the law of the sea on the other. Torts committed at sea are subject to maritime law, which differs from
the ordinary common law in several respects, for instance,
in respect to the treatment of contributory negligence. However, the difference as. to the rules of substantive law is only
an indirect consequence of the fact that two different sets of
courts have respective jurisdiction over land and over maritime cases, viz. the ordinary courts of common law and equity
on the one side, and the courts of admiralty on the other. To
draw the line of demarcation between these two sets of courts
has been the task of the courts in those cases which are encountered in the torts field. For centuries, the two sets of
courts have been rivals. From the days of Lord Coke to the
eighteenth century, the English common law lawyers fought
against the competitibn of the civilian lawyers with whom
the courts of admiralty were staffed. The outcome of their
long struggle was that the jurisdiction of the admiralty
courts was limited to cases which were strictly confined to the
"19Supra note 84.
120117 Ind. 439, 20 N. E. 287 (1889).
121113 Ala. 402, 21 So. 938 (1897).
122 See, e. g., the programmatic statement in the last paragraph at p. 6.
123SuZ6p note 114.
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When, as late as 1785, the problem of "mixed cases"

was settled in Rex v. Coombes,1' 2 the struggle had abated, and
the common law judges could afford to be so generous as to
leave to the admiralty courts jurisdiction when the conduct
was carried on on land and the effect took place at sea. In
reaching this result, they were quite obviously influenced by
the criminal law cases.i26

In the United States the problem of drawing the line between the jurisdiction of common law courts and admiralty
courts assumed political importance because it coincided with
the demarcation of state power from federal power, 127 a delicate problem of explosive character. In 1851, the United
States Supreme Court had taken the bold step of asserting
that the federal admiralty power extended over all navigable
inland waters. 12

In accordance with time-honored judicial

tradition, this innovation was not, however, labelled as such,
but was expressed in terms of a conclusion derived from longexisting rules of law. When the considerably less important
problem of "mixed torts" came up for decision in 1865,129 and
when in that case the Court was expressly asked to carry on
the policy of extending federal jurisdiction, the Court was
obviously happy to have an occasion to prove that its decisions in matters of admiralty jurisdiction were rendered
strictly in accordance with law, and following Story's decision in United States v. Davis,10 which as we have seen,
was based on Rex v. Coombes,131 it decided that federal jurisdiction could not be exercised in a case where7 the harm had
12 4For descriptions of fhe long -struggle between common law courts
and admiralty courts, see Mears, The History of the Admiralty Jurisdiction, 2 Essays in Anglo-American Legal History (1908) 312; 1
Holdsworth, History of English Law (1922) 553; 5 id. (1924) 143.
' 2 5Supra note 116.
126See infra at pp. 195-197.

127 See U. S. Const., Art. 3, § 2, cl. 1.
' 28 The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How. 443, 13 L. Ed. 1058 (U. S.
1851).
' 29 The Plymouth, supra note 114.
"3OSupra note 115.
"'ISupranote 116.
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occurred on land, even though the harm-creating conduct took
place upon navigable waters. The Plymouth became the starting point for a long line of decisions which were all concerned
with marking off the federal maritime jurisdiction from the
land jurisdiction of the state courts ;132 and which were all
regarded as precedents in the peculiar case of the American
passenger drowned in the disaster of the French ship, 13 3 a
case which, as we have seen, has come to occupy a prominent
position among the cases claimed to support the place-ofharm rule.
In terms these admiralty cases "define" the "place of
wrong," but they do so in their own context and for their own
purposes, and the policies on the basis of which the jurisdiction of admiralty courts is marked off from that of state
courts are different from those which are to be considered
in choice-of-law cases.
The same sin of concluding that identity of words necessarily indicates identity of issues and policies was committed
when criminal law cases were used as precedents for the decision of problems of choice of law. For reasons which were
closely connected with the jury system and particularly with
the principle that the jury was always to be summoned from
the vicinage, the conclusion was drawn in England that venue
in criminal cases was to be laid in the county in which the
crime was committed. Even when this rule had been softened,
134
it was analogously applied to the problem of jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction over crime, it was said, is local and cannot be
exercised by any state or country other than that where the
132 See especially Leonard v. Decker, 22 Fed. 741 (D. C. N. Y. 1884);
The City of Lincoln, 25 Fed. 835 (D. C. N. Y. 1885); City of Milwaukee
v. The Curtiss, 37 Fed. 705 (D. C. Wis. 1889); The H. S. Pickands, 42
Fed. 239 (D. C. Mich. 1890); The Mary Garrett, 63 Fed. 1009 (D. C.
Cal. 1894); Hermann v. Port Blakely Mill Co., 69 Fed. 646 (D. C. Cal.

1895); of. Robinson, Handbook of Admiralty Law in the United States
(1939) 76.
133Rundell v. La Compagnie G6n6rale Transatlantique, supra note 113.
34

1

As to the historical development, see Sack, c. cit. supra note 29.
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crime was committed. 135 When the perpetrator of an alleged
crime is acting in one state and produces a criminal effect in
another, the problem arises as to which of those two states
shall have jurisdiction to prosecute and punish. After considering the background just stated, one can easily understand
why this problem was expressed in terms of the determination of the "place where the crime was committed" or simply
the determination of the "place of wrong." Seemingly we
have the same problem as in the choice-of-law cases concerning civil liability for tort; but, again, the issues and, consequently, the underlying policies are different. The policies
to be considered in criminal cases have resulted in a significant break with the old law. In England itself as well as in
most American states jurisdiction over a criminal prosecution is now assumed by both the state where the accused
acted and the state where the effect took place. A person is
then held criminally responsible at the place whose standards of permissible conduct have been violated and by the
state which wishes to -protect the interests regarded to be
located within it and declared by its law to be worthy of protection. This solution corresponds to sound policy provided
a limitation is recognized: in order not to be incompatible
with the principle of protection of justified expectations, a
state must not punish a person for conduct which was permissible in the state where it was carried on and which could
not reasonably be foreseen to produce harmful effects in a
state where such conduct is criminal. 'Such situations will be
rare, however. As contrasted with torts, most crimes require intent in the sense of foreseeability of the harmful effect. Indeed, the elaborate survey of the cases in Stimson's
book on the conflict of criminal laws 136 does not contain a
sifigle case in which an accused, while acting in one state, produced a criminal effect in another state which he could not
135The cases are collected in Stimson, Conflict of Criminal Laws
(1936) 20 et seq. See also Harvard Research in International Law,
Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 Am. Jour.
Int. Law (Supp.) 439 et seq. (1935).
1360p, cit. supra note 135.
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have reasonably expected. Thus, as to criminal law the general place-of-harm rule, although not accurate, is at least innocuous. But its uncritical importation into the conflict of
laws was a source of harm and confusion.
Equally unjustified was the uncritical use of cases dealing
with "local actions." We have seen above that in England
the choice-of-law technique was not used bef're the latter
part of the eighteenth century. No law other than the common law of England was applied by the Royal Courts at
Westminster, and whenever a case was brought before them in
which the application of that law would have been inappropriate, they simply refused to take jurisdiction.137 When the
choice-of-law technique was introduced into the courts of
England, and actions requiring decision under foreign law became "transitory," the older approach survived in several exceptions. With respect to divorce cases, for instance, the
old technique has been preserved to the present day both in
England and the United States. Whether a ground for divorce exists is not decided by any law other than that of
the forum, and the only question of conflict of laws considered
in divorce cases is not one of choice of law but of jurisdiction.
Once a court has found that it has jurisdiction to hear an action for divorce, it applies its own substantive law as a matter
of course.
A similar situation exists in cases dealing with the internal
affairs of corporations 38 and in workmen's compensation
cases to be decided by industrial commissions or similar
boards. Finally, it has survived in actions concerning title to
land, including actions for trespass to land. Such actions are
still regarded as "local," i. e., as actions which cannot be
brought in any place other than that where the land is situated. 39 Whether this approach is justified need not be investigated here. Insofar as it exists, it is clear that actions
' 3 7 See supra at p. 23.
13SCf. 2 Beale, op. cit supra note 4, at p. 885, § 192. 1.
13 9 See supra at pp. 168-171.
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for trespass to land brought in a place other than that of the
situs must be declared to be inadmissible, even though they
might have been brought at the place where the alleged trespasser was acting. To use such cases as precedents in choiceof-law cases is inappropriate- because they, again, have nothing but words in common with cases where the problem is one
of choice of law.
The problem which we have discussed in this long article
is narrow, but it is significant. It neatly illustrates a way of
thinking which has done harm in many fields of law. A certain act which is disapproved in the legal order and which is
therefore called a "wrong" must be localized for a certain
purpose, and in so doing the court uses the short-hand term of
"place of wrong." At some later time some other wrong
must be localized for some other purpose. Without inquiring
whether the same localization is justified by similarity of
policies, the court seizes upon the term "place of wrong" and
uses it in the new context. This method of "lump concept
thinking"'140 has been properly and severely criticized in recent years. It has resulted in the abuse of such terms as
title,' 4 ' delivery, 142 domicile, 43 and marriage. 44
If stare
decisis is to fulfill its proper function, it must free itself from
the blind assumption that homophonous words denote identical problems. 45 A sound "jurisprudence of interests" must
consider the interests at stake in every particular problem in
the light of the policy judgments prevailing in the community
in question. Under such an approach even our proposals as
to the treament of tort problems in choice-of-law cases will
140 The term has been coined by Karl N. Llewellyn; see his Cases and
Materials on the Law of Sales (1930) 561.
14 1See Llewellyn, op. cit. supra note 140.
14 2 See Rabel, A Draft of an International Law of Sales, 5 Univ. Chi.
L. Rev. 543, 549 et seq. (1938).
143See especially Cook, op. cit. supra note 23, ch. 7.
144 See Bingham, The American Law Institute v. The Supreme Court
in the Matter of Haddock v. Haddock, 21 Corn. L. Quar. 393 (1936);
Bingham, Song of Sixpence, 29 id. 1 (194a).
' 45Cf. Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 Am. Bar Assn. Jour.

71 (1928).
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probably turn out to be too broad.
Our' argumentation,
though it is hoped to be applicable to the problem of whether
a certain type of conduct subjects the actor to civil liability,
may well appear to be inapplicable to such other problems as
measure of damages, influence upon the tort-feasor's liability
of contributory fault of the tort victim, or to such peculiar defenses as the fellow-servant rule or assumption of risk. Upon
closer investigation, the holding of the Carroll case may well
turn out to be justified. The case, it should be noted, was not
concerned with the tortious character of the conduct of the
employee for which the railroad was sought to be held liable,
but with the availability of the defense of fellow-servant. This
very fact should have been a caution signal against the use of
the decision as a precedent in cases concerned with the problem of whether certain conduct is tortious in the sense
of creating liability in the absence of special defenses.
Further investigation of problems of this kind is needed as
well as investigation to determine the scope of problems to
which the choice-of-law rule concerning tort liability can appropriately be applied. It will then turn out that the place-ofwrong rule, in whichever sense it is understood, is inappropriate for determining the law which decides whether personal
injury claims are permissible as between husband and wife,
or whether a personal injury claim is to be satisfied out of the
14
assets of a decedent estate.
146Cf. Cook, op. cit. supra note 23, at pp. 248, 345; Rheinstein, Review
of Hancock: Torts in the Conflict of Laws, 41 Mich. L. Rev. 83, 95
(1942).
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